the islamic state – between vision and reality

Critics of the Islamic state project often raise the issue of a caliph/leader/sultan in an Islamic state – past, present and future – being a tyrant and the Islamic state inevitably being reduced into a dictatorship.

I do not think its entirely fair to dismiss such criticisms as stemming from pure ignorance.

If the classical Islamic state under the Umayyads or Abbasids were to be judged according to modern political standards, I think it is quite clear that it could categorized as different shades of authoritarianism or absolute monarchy. And the point that is often made is that it is only a small step away from being a benevolent monarch to a dictator.

Having said that, it is also unfair to assume that the establishment of an Islamic state or a caliphate will inevitably degenerate into a dictatorship or authoritarianism.

Under the classical Islamic state, there was a check and balance between the ruler/caliph/sultan and the ulama/religious scholars; the ruler derives their legitimacy from the ulama, whilst the ulama depended on the ruler to uphold the Sharia’. In a liberal democracy, this notion of check and balance is incorporated in the notion of the separation of powers between the different branches of legislature, executive and judiciary.

I think the issue is the preservation of such a check and balance mechanism in any political structure i.e. whether it is robust enough to be protected against any political machinations or manipulations.

Given the lamentable state of our religious scholars/ulama today, what kind of check and balance can we expect to exist in the envisioned Islamic state model, that will prevent what is historically a monarchy from becoming a dictatorship?

Brother Azad mentioned that he has no problems with democracy within the Islamic state framework; does this mean that there will be some kind of separation of powers in the system? Or will we instead have a Guardian Council ala Iran – whose members are selected by another council or elected by the public – that will check the powers of the leader/caliph/sultan?

If that the case, then how will it be any different from the Iranian mode of Velayat-e-Faqih, where you have a curious hybrid of a theocracy grafted on a democratic model of government. Is the Iranian model of the Islamic state what we are going after?

(Note that there is also a spiritual dimension to the compatibility between the Rule by the Jurist model in Iran with Shi’ theology/worldview).

Which brings us to the second issue concerning the establishment of an Islamic state – which model of an Islamic state do we want? Since most Islamist based their arguments for the creation of the Islamic state on historical precedents – actual or imagined – I think there is a pressing need to agree upon a set of key aspects that must be present in any Islamic state regardless of which country or in which society it is established in.

It is fair to say that “it is not surprising to have more than 1 model of any ideology because a model has to suit its local surroundings, practices and behaviour.” But that not should be taken as a carte blanche to proceed on the Islamic state project in whatever way one might choose.

I always find it puzzling whenever an Islamist talks about the Islamic state project as if there aren’t any already existing Islamic state around – Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan, Iran, Saudi Arabia to name a few. I think there are important lessons that could be drawn from the successes (or tragic failures) of the Islamic state projects in these countries and Islamist would do well to be aware of these lessons before getting carried away with the utopian vision of the Islamic state that they are chasing after.

Whenever I asked an Islamist about the kind of Islamic state they want and how is it dissimilar from the model we have in say, Pakistan, they often reply by saying that that is not what they want and that it is different from their own vision of the Islamic state. But when pressed to further elaborate on these differences, they usually cannot give a detailed answer on why these other models are not to their liking.

It is scandalous that if we have 1001 Muslims claiming to base their Islamic state project on say, the Medinan model founded by the Prophet, all of them can and will come up with 1001 different varieties of the model; and yet all of them claims to be inspired by a singular historical fact!

Osama bin Laden claims to call for the creation of an Islamic state based on the Medinan model; President Ahmedinajad claims that his idea of the Islamic state is derived from the Medinan model; Saudi Arabia claims that its brand of Islamic state is closest to the Medinan model. Anyone from anywhere can easily say that they wished to create an Islamic state based on a single historical fact, but eventually all of them will end up with different approaches and outcomes. And to top it off, each of them proceeds to condemn the other’s versions of the Islamic state!

This is so much of diversity, but more of confusion; this is less of a sign of flexibility, but more of a indicator of dogmatism. It is a discourse which excludes rather than accommodates. And it is an attitude which is repugnant to the universalist message of Islam itself.

Therefore, I think what is required is for us to come up a checklist or prerequisites for a country to qualify as an Islamic state; for liberal democracy for instance, there are a set of items that most, if not all countries who claim to be a liberal democracy should posses: the people is the sovereign, the will of the majority represents the will of the people, equality before the law, free and fair elections etc.

So when you have a list of criteria of what constitutes a liberal democracy, then we can start going around the globe and measuring the fidelity of countries to these standards and whether we can safely call that particular country a liberal democracy or not.

Therefore, rather than arguing on the minutiae about what should or should not go into a liberal democracy, we could focus on ensuring that any countries that profess to be a liberal democracy remains loyal to these fundamental precepts.

The same treatment should be applied to this idea of an Islamic state too: we should agree upon a set of fundamental ideas which all vision of the Islamic state would share. Once we got that out of the way, we can then focus on improving the political, social and economic conditions in most Muslim countries so that they will be worthy to having the label “Islamic” attached to their names.

As long as we choose to ignore this basic need to define and pin down what is essentially a nebulous concept of an Islamic state, we will forever be chasing mirages, not actualizing visions.